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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BEFORE
REALISM
Jud Campbell*
This Essay excavates a forgotten way of thinking about the relationship between state and federal constitutional rights that was prevalent from
the Founding through the early twentieth century. Prior to the ascendancy
of legal realism, American jurists understood most fundamental rights as a
species of general law that applied across jurisdictional lines, regardless
of whether these rights were constitutionally enumerated. And like other
forms of general law, state and federal courts shared responsibility for interpreting and enforcing these rights. Nor did the Fourteenth Amendment
initially disrupt this paradigm in ways that we might expect. Rather than
viewing rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment as distinctively “national,” most early interpreters thought that these rights remained a species
of general law. For several decades, debates instead focused on the extent
to which these rights were enforceable in federal court, akin to the way that
federal courts could hear general-law claims in diversity-jurisdiction cases.
It was only with the rise of legal realism that American jurists began to
conceptualize fundamental rights distinctively in terms of state (constitutional) law and federal (constitutional) law and to divide interpretive authority into state and federal spheres.
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How do rights secured by state constitutions relate to those secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment? For instance, do state-level guarantees of religious and
expressive freedoms have the same legal content as the “incorporated” federal
rights supplied by the First Amendment? 1 Some state courts say yes. But this
* Associate Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. The author thanks Danny Zemel and
Nathaniel Obinwa for their research assistance and the participants in this symposium for helpful comments.
1. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (recognizing the incorporation of the First Amendment against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment); Bennefield v. Commonwealth, 467 S.E.2d 306, 311 (Va.
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approach is not required. Modern legal interpretation is largely grounded on the
intent of the lawmakers, 2 so even identical language in different constitutions
can carry different meanings. 3 State constitutional rights need not track their federal counterparts. 4
Building on this insight, Judge Sutton’s 51 Imperfect Solutions challenges
us to rethink the relationship between state and federal constitutional rights. 5
“There is no reason to think, as an interpretive matter,” he writes, “that constitutional guarantees of independent sovereigns, even guarantees with the same or
similar words, must be construed in the same way.” 6 Many state constitutional
rights predated the federal constitution or emerged in entirely different circumstances. 7 Moreover, he argues, giving state constitutional rights independent potency would accord with values of federalism and would perhaps also “ease the
pressure on the U.S. Supreme Court to be the key rights innovator in modern
America.” 8
This Essay aims to show that the federal dominance Judge Sutton laments
and the state-based “imperfect solutions” he offers reflect modern shifts in the
way that we think about constitutional rights. 9 In particular, Americans used to
view the state and federal bills of rights as declaratory of rights that were common across jurisdictions rather than as creating rights specific to that jurisdiction. 10 Back then, contrary to Judge Sutton’s suggestion, there was “reason to
think, as an interpretive matter, that constitutional guarantees of independent
sovereigns” carried the same meaning. 11 But this understanding also meant that
Ct. App. 1996) (“Our courts have consistently held that the protections afforded under the Virginia Constitution
are co-extensive with those in the United States Constitution.”).
2. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 591 (2008).
3. See Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651, 675 (2006) (“The definition of
a term in one statute does not necessarily control the interpretation of that term in another statute, for where the
purposes or contexts are different the terms may take on different meanings.”); Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos
Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 501 (1992) (“This Court . . . has not inflexibly required the same term to be interpreted
in the same way for all purposes.”); Ezpeleta v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 800 F.2d 119, 122 (7th Cir. 1986)
(“Similar sounding phrases often have different meanings when applied in different legal contexts.”).
4. See JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 173 (2018).
5. Id. at 174.
6. Id.
7. See id. at 175.
8. Id. at 214.
9. I am indebted to the many scholars who have written about aspects of this transformation in far greater
detail, and particularly to Charles McCurdy for introducing me to the concept of general constitutional law in his
Salmon P. Chase Lecture in 2018. See Charles W. McCurdy, The Problem of General Constitutional Law:
Thomas McIntyre Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, and the Supreme Court of the United States, 1868-1878,
18 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2020). This Essay aims to show how the debates in different eras fit together and
how the modern problems that Judge Sutton addresses are fundamentally the product of shifts in understanding
of rights precipitated by the legal realist movement. The argument is descriptive, without taking any normative
position about the proper use of history.
10. See, e.g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 571 (1949) (mentioning “rights derived from
the Constitution of the United States”).
11. SUTTON, supra note 4, at 174 (“There is no reason to think, as an interpretive matter, that constitutional
guarantees of independent sovereigns, even guarantees with the same or similar words, must be construed in the
same way.”).
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no single jurisdiction was supreme the in exposition of those rights. With the
ascendancy of legal realism, however, all of this changed.
Part I begins by exploring debates in the late 1780s about whether state
constitutional provisions could be used to identify rights against the federal government. What these debates reveal is a prevalent understanding of bills of rights
as declaratory. On this view, rights were merely recognized in, and not created
by, their placement in a constitution. Consequently, many Americans thought it
possible to ascertain the rights that operated against the federal government by
looking to state declarations of rights.
Of course, the Founders eventually opted for amendments—now known as
the Bill of Rights—which then led to the question addressed in Part II: What, if
any, relevance did federal constitutional provisions have when trying to ascertain
limits on state power? Today, we typically answer this question quickly: The Bill
of Rights did not apply to states before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 Indeed, that seems to be the holding of Barron v. Baltimore. 13 “As Barron confirms,” Judge Sutton states, “the key individual rights guarantees in the
U.S. Constitution originally restricted the federal government.” 14
This conventional wisdom is sort of true. But from a historical perspective,
it conceals a different way of understanding the source and operation of rights.
Barron held that federal courts lacked federal-question jurisdiction to hear rights
claims against state governments. 15 But Barron in no way resolved a lively debate about the declaratory nature of enumerated rights. The rights mentioned in
state declarations and in the federal constitution were often conceptualized as a
species of general law, not as a form of enacted law that one would expect to
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. State courts could—and often did—refer
to the federal constitution and other state constitutions as evidence of the rights
that operated against their governments.
Part III then considers the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment. The crucial issue that emerged after 1868 was not—as we usually assume—identifying
which rights the Fourteenth Amendment created (or, to use the modern lingo,
“incorporated”) against the states. Those rights already existed. 16 Rather, the
central controversy in the late nineteenth century was the extent to which the
Fourteenth Amendment added a new way of enforcing these rights.
Part IV then considers the collapse of this earlier understanding of rights
under the weight of legal realism. Once legal realism took the reins, with rights
viewed in a positivist light, the notion of general fundamental rights became unsustainable on its own terms. Rights were not the creature of nature or some imagined social contract, realists implored. Rather, rights were a creature of positive law.
12. See SUTTON, supra note 4, at 12.
13. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 251–52 (1833).
14. SUTTON, supra note 4, at 12.
15. Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 251–52.
16. The question of “political rights”—that is, rights to participation in the administration of government,
like voting, legislative eligibility, and juror eligibility—were analyzed differently. See PAMELA BRANDWEIN,
RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION 61 (2011).
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This Essay highlights two shifts that emerged from this new understanding
of constitutional rights. First, realism suggested that there was not one set of fundamental rights but rather fifty-one sets of constitutionally created rights. 17 In
this way, it became more persuasive to argue—as did Justice Frankfurter, 18 then
Justice Brennan, 19 and now Judge Sutton—that states ought to interpret their
constitutions as independent sources of law, without being necessarily tied to
federal rights. Indeed, as Judge Sutton notes, the idea that “differently situated
sovereigns” would happen to have identical rights “often seems inexplicable”
given modern premises about constitutional interpretation. 20
At the same time, however, the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment had
actually created rights—not simply secured them—suggested that federal authorities, and particularly federal judges, were supreme in their exposition. A right
created by the federal constitution was a right over which states had no claim of
interpretive authority. The path was thus laid for greater federal supremacy in the
definition of constitutional rights.
The controversies that have engaged Judge Sutton are the product of these
developments. Whether we self-identify as legal realists or not, the terrain of
rights discourse was fundamentally reshaped by the triumph of legal realism
nearly a century ago.
I.

STATE ENUMERATED RIGHTS AS LIMITS ON FEDERAL POWER

Americans today usually talk about rights as a creature of constitutional
law. Identifying these rights, therefore, requires either explicit constitutional text,
as with the rights of free exercise, free speech, and so forth, or else at least a
plausible textual hook, as with “substantive” due process rights or Ninth Amendment rights. 21 Either way, though, the ultimate source of constitutional rights is
the Constitution. 22 The terminology alone—“constitutional rights”—suggests as
much.

17.
18.

Of course, there weren’t fifty-one states earlier in the twentieth century, but you get the point.
See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59–69 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); FELIX
FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 74–75 (1930).
19. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489, 491 (1977) (“State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.”).
20. SUTTON, supra at 4, at 174–75.
21. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,
949 (1973) (“A neutral and durable principle may be a thing of beauty and a joy forever. But if it lacks connection
with any value the Constitution marks as special, it is not a constitutional principle and the Court has no business
imposing it.”).
22. See, e.g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 571 (1949) (mentioning “rights derived from
the Constitution of the United States”). Revealingly, Justice Jackson cited to Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Carr,
which mentioned “rights secured . . . by the Constitution of the United States,” 272 U.S. 494, 507 (1926) (emphasis added).
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But many Americans simply did not think that way in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. A principal reason why was their immersion in social-contract theory. 23
In essence, social-contract theory was a backward-looking thought experiment designed to justify, and to limit, governmental authority. 24 The basic idea
was straightforward. To understand the proper role of government, one can imagine a situation in which no government existed and then reconstruct the basic
terms under which individuals would have unanimously agreed in a “social contract” (or “social compact” 25) to join together to form a political society—a body
politic known as “the people.” Only after everyone had reached this unanimous
agreement would the people then, under majority rule, form a system of government in a constitution. 26
Social-contract theory was ubiquitous in American constitutional thought,
although sometimes hidden in plain sight. Consider the very first sentence of the
Constitution. In the Preamble, William Findley of Pennsylvania recognized during the ratification controversy, “it is said, ‘We the People,’ and not ‘We the
States,’ which therefore is a compact between individuals entering into society,
and not between separate states enjoying independent power and delegating a
portion of that power for their common benefit.” 27 State constitutions, too, often
began with a basic statement of the precepts of social-contract theory. 28
Americans widely thought that individuals entering into a social contract
would have agreed that the body politic had to preserve natural liberty—the freedom that humans would enjoy in an imagined state of nature—and had to guarantee certain positive rights, which Theophilus Parsons described as “the equivalent every man receives, as a consideration for the rights he has surrendered.”29
23. This Part draws from an earlier blog post. See Jud Campbell, The Bill of Rights and Social Contract
Theory, BALKINIZATION (Apr. 13, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/04/the-bill-of-rights-and-social-contract.html.
24. Id.
25. The term “social compact” is more historically accurate, but I want to avoid the possibility of confusion
with the separate historical debate over the nature of the union, including the “compact theory” of Thomas Jefferson and others.
26. See Jud Campbell, Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 85, 89
(2017).
27. Pennsylvania Ratification Convention Debates (Dec. 1, 1787) (remarks of William Findley), in 2 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 447–48 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) (emphasis omitted); see also Luther Martin, Genuine Information IV, (Jan. 8, 1788), in THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 296, 297 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1984) (“It
is in its very introduction declared to be a compact between the people of the United States as individuals . . .
[rather than] by the States as States in their sovereign capacity.”) (emphasis omitted). See generally Jonathan
Gienapp, The Myth of the Constitutional Given: Enumeration and National Power at the Founding, 69 AM. U.
L. REV. FORUM 183, 194–209 (2020) (discussing these debates about the preamble).
28. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, pmbl. (“The body politic is formed by a voluntary association of
individuals: it is a social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with
the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good.”); N.H. CONST. of 1784, art.
1 (“All men are born equally free and independent: Therefore, all government, of right, originates from the people,
is founded in consent, and instituted for the general good.”).
29. Theophilus Parsons, Essex Result, in MEMOIR OF THEOPHILUS PARSONS 359, 367 (Boston, Ticknor &
Fields 1861).

1438

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2020

These positive rights were rules about what the government had to do, like provide for trial by jury, and what the government could not do, like impose cruel
and unusual punishments. 30 Consequently, as Thomas Jefferson explained,
rights included not only “unceded portions of right”—that is natural rights, like
“freedom of religion”—but also “certain fences which experience has proved
peculiarly efficacious against wrong, and rarely obstructive of right,” like “trial
by jury, Habeas corpus laws, [and] free presses.” 31
For those who thought that individual rights were guaranteed in the social
contract, it was unnecessary to enumerate them in a constitution or declaration
of rights. The rights already existed. That did not mean that declaring rights was
worthless; enumeration, for instance, might facilitate the political and judicial
defense of rights. Declarations, Larry Kramer points out, could give rights “a
degree of explicitness and clarity.” 32 But crucially, as historians have broadly
recognized, 33 enumeration was mostly a declaratory exercise. 34 The Ninth
Amendment, with its reference to other rights “retained by the people,” reflects
the same idea. 35
The Framers of the federal Constitution famously omitted a bill of rights.
But the omission, they frequently argued, was inconsequential. 36 In part, their
argument rested on the inherent fundamentality of certain rights. 37 “A Bill of
Rights,” George Nicholas explained at the ratification convention in Virginia, “is
only an acknowledgement of the pre-existing claim to rights in the people. They

30. Jud Campbell, Judicial Review and the Enumeration of Rights, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 569, 576–
79 (2017).
31. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Noah Webster, Jr. (Dec. 4, 1790), in 18 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 131, 132 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1971).
32. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
51 (2004).
33. See, e.g., John Phillip Reid, The Authority of Rights at the American Founding, in THE NATURE OF
RIGHTS AT THE AMERICAN FOUNDING AND BEYOND 67, 97 (Barry Alan Shain ed., 2007); GORDON S. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 295 (1969); see also Michael W. McConnell, Tradition and Constitutionalism Before the Constitution, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 197 (“Our written Constitution
presupposes an established set of fundamental rights not created by the Constitution but protected or preserved
by it.”).
34. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 171, 171–72 (1992); Suzanna
Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1157–58 (1987); William Michael
Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 502 (2005). A caveat is that enumerating rights
in a constitution was also a way of “recognizing the fundamentality of positive rights not supported by custom.”
Campbell, supra, note 30, at 577.
35. Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 20 (1988). Michael
McConnell, however, views enumeration as a critical step in recognizing the constitutional status of rights. See
Michael W. McConnell, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment: How Does Lockean Legal Theory Assist in
Interpretation?, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 19–20 (2010). But see KURT T. LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE
NINTH AMENDMENT 82 (2009) (“In sum: The text of the Ninth Amendment prevents interpretations of enumerated rights that negatively affect the unenumerated retained rights of the people. . . . [T]he fact of enumeration . . .
[cannot be] relied upon to suggest the necessity or superiority of enumeration.”) (emphasis omitted).
36. See Campbell, supra note 30, at 572, 576–77.
37. See id.
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belong to us as much as if they had been inserted in the Constitution.” 38 This was
a common refrain. 39
But Federalists also made frequent reference to the sufficiency of statelevel rights guarantees. “The state Declarations of Rights are not repealed by this
Constitution, and being in force are sufficient,” Connecticut delegate Roger
Sherman insisted toward the end of the Philadelphia Convention. 40 For those
used to thinking about constitutional rights in positivist terms, this looks like a
bizarre argument. Michael Klarman describes Sherman’s position as “surprisingly weak” and “hard to fathom.” 41 How, we might ask, could state constitutions possibly limit federal power? The idea seems to turn federal supremacy on
its head.
If we view Sherman’s argument through the lens of social-contract theory,
however, it actually makes good sense. The original source of sovereignty, after
all, was the consent of the people to the social contract. 42 Unlike state bodies
politic, however, the federal body politic was about to be formed through a partial delegation of sovereignty from state bodies politic—not through the presumed agreement of every individual in the entire country. 43 “[W]e are not working on the natural rights of men not yet gathered into society, but upon those
rights, modified by society,” Edmund Randolph explained during the Philadelphia Convention. 44 And this reveals why Sherman disclaimed any need for a
federal bill of rights. 45 The rights belonged to individuals, and therefore state
bodies politic could not grant power to violate them any more than states could
violate those rights themselves.
Other Federalists drew on social-contract theory to make the same argument. 46 Individual rights were “already provided for by the State Constitutions,”
Tench Coxe insisted, “and relating only to personal rights, they could not be
mentioned in a contract among sovereign states.” 47 Importantly, Coxe was not
denying federal sovereignty by adopting the proto-Confederate position that the
Constitution was simply a glorified treaty—a “compact under the style & title of
38. Virginia Ratiﬁcation Convention Debates (June 16, 1788) (remarks of George Nicholas), in 10 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1334 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1993).
Interestingly, the term “bill of rights” was much less prevalent in the United States until the twentieth century.
See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, THE HEART OF THE CONSTITUTION: HOW THE BILL OF RIGHTS BECAME THE BILL
OF RIGHTS 5 (2018).
39. See Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 299–300 (2017).
40. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 588 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
41. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
552 (2016).
42. This is what James Wilson was talking about when he wrote, “The sovereign, when traced to his source,
must be found in the man.” Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 458 (1793) (Wilson, J., concurring); see
Campbell, supra note 26, at 88–89.
43. See Campbell, supra note 26, at 109–10.
44. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 40, at 137.
45. Id. at 138.
46. See, e.g., [Samuel Tenney], Alfredus (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 28 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 86, 88–89 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2017).
47. Tench Coxe, An American Citizen IV: On the Federal Government (Oct. 21, 1787), reprinted in 13
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 431, 434 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981).
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a Constitution,” as Thomas Jefferson infamously declared in 1798. 48 Rather,
Coxe was restating the standard Federalist position that the Constitution would
form a national body politic through a delegation of sovereignty rather than
through an original social contract among individuals. 49
II. FEDERAL ENUMERATED RIGHTS AS LIMITS ON STATE POWER
The conventional wisdom is that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the
states. 50 The full picture is more complicated. For those in the nineteenth century
who understood the federal amendments as merely declaratory of existing rights,
the federal amendments supplied evidence of the people’s rights just like the various provisions of state constitutions. Rights, on this view, were declared and
secured by constitutions, not created by them.
The Georgia Supreme Court was particularly vocal in embracing this
view. 51 For example, in Nunn v. State, 52 the defendant challenged the validity of
a Georgia concealed-carry restriction based on a right to keep and bear arms that
was not explicitly mentioned in the Georgia constitution. Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Joseph Lumpkin began by citing cases from other states explicating
the scope of the right. 53 “It is true,” he acknowledged, “that these adjudications
are all made on clauses in the State Constitutions.” 54 That, however, was a distinction without a difference, because “these instruments confer no new rights on
the people which did not belong to them before.” 55 Rather, the right to bear arms
was a right “guarantied to British subjects” and “one of the fundamental principles, upon which rests the great fabric of civil liberty.” 56 Moreover, Chief Justice
Lumpkin pointed out, the Second Amendment to the federal constitution had, “in
declaring that the right of the people to keep and bear arms . . . should not be
infringed, only reiterated a truth announced a century before [in the English Bill
of Rights].” 57
Some courts, he admitted, had denied that the rights mentioned in the federal amendments were limits on state power. 58 But Chief Justice Lumpkin was
48. KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS OF 1798 AND 1799, reprinted in 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 540 (2d ed. 1863).
49. To be sure, Anti-Federalists had reasonable arguments on the other side. See, e.g., 2 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 254, 376 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). My only goal here is to recover a lost strand of Federalist thought, not to pick sides.
50. See, e.g., SUTTON, supra note 4, at 12 (citing Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833)).
51. For many more cases from a variety of states, see Jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rights in the Early State
Courts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1, 32–55 (2007). The classic treatment of these “Barron contrarians” is AKHIL REED
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 153–57 (1998); see also WILLIAM DAVENPORT
MERCER, DIMINISHING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: BARRON V. BALTIMORE AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN
LIBERTY 189–99 (2017).
52. 1 Ga. 243 (1846).
53. Id. at 247–49.
54. Id. at 249.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 250.
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invoking them in a different way. “[T]he people of the several States, in ratifying
[the federal amendments] in their respective State conventions, have virtually
adopted them as beacon-lights to guide and control the action of their own legislatures, as well as that of Congress.” 59 Consequently, the declaration of an “unalienable right” in the federal constitution affirmed the existence of that right “at
the bottom of every free government.” 60 These protections, he explained, were
“as perfect under the State as the national legislature, and cannot be violated by
either.” 61
But viewing rights as derived from nature or the social compact—rather
than from their constitutional enumeration—did not deprive the government of
authority to regulate them by law. This idea sounds discordant to modern ears,
but it was harmonious to nineteenth-century jurists. 62 As understood from the
founding through the early twentieth century, natural rights were regulable in
promotion of the public good. 63 “True liberty,” James Iredell noted, “consists in
such restraints, and no greater, on the actions of each particular individual as the
common good of the whole requires.” 64 “[T]he right to speak and act,” American
patriot James Otis explained at the onset of the colonial conflict, “is limited by
the law—Political liberty consists in a freedom of speech and action, so far as
the laws of a community will permit, and no farther.” 65 And because of this definition of natural rights, judges had very little room to overturn legislative judgments about how these rights could be curtailed. 66
Consequently, and quite confusingly to modern readers, the regulability of
rights meant that recognizing a common set of rights, applicable against the state
and federal governments alike, 67 did not necessarily mean that those rights had
the same legal boundaries. 68 These rights, Chief Justice Ringo of the Arkansas
Supreme Court summarized in State v. Buzzard, did not forbid “such regulations
59. Id. at 250–51.
60. Id. at 250.
61. Id. at 251. Other judges reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 43 (1842)
(opinion of Lacy, J.) (“Many of these rights [enumerated in the Bill of Rights] lie behind the Constitution, and
existed antecedent to its formation and its adoption. They are embodied in its will, and organized by its power,
to give them greater sanctity and effect. They are written that they may be understood and remembered; and then
declared inviolate and supreme, because they cannot be weakened or invaded without doing the government and
citizen manifest injustice and wrong.”).
62. Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due Process and the
Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 752 (2009).
63. See Campbell, supra note 26, at 92–98; Nourse, supra note 62.
64. James Iredell’s Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts (Oct.
12, 1792), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at
308, 310 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988).
65. Freeborn American, BOS. GAZETTE & COUNTRY J., Mar. 9, 1767, reprinted in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 95, 95 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1966).
66. See Campbell, supra note 30, at 572–74.
67. Though states had their own social contracts, the terms of these social contracts were determined by
abstract reasoning about what individuals would agree to upon entering into a political society—not an interpretive inquiry into what individuals had actually agreed to at a particular moment. Thus, discussion of a particular
state’s social contract was interchangeable with reasoning about “fundamental principles of free governments”
and the like.
68. See Campbell, supra note 26, at 92–93.
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as might be found necessary to prevent [the] exercise [of these rights] from operating prejudicially upon the private rights of others, or to the general interests
of the community.” 69 The guarantees of the right to keep and bear arms under
the Arkansas constitution and the federal Second Amendment were “declaratory
of the same right,” Justice Dickinson explained in the same case, yet states had
the authority to restrict that right under a “police regulation,” 70 and “[t]he police
of a State is to be regulated by its own laws.” 71 This understanding of rights
opened the door to diversity among states in the legal content of rights, even
though the rights were conceptually identical from state to state. 72 Countless
other judges in the nineteenth century took a similar approach. 73
In light of this history, the Supreme Court’s famous holding in Barron v.
Baltimore seems more modest. Because the Court’s appellate jurisdiction to review state court decisions was strictly limited to federal questions, it was enough
for Chief Justice Marshall to say that the Takings Clause did not, as a matter of
federal law, bind state governments. 74 But in suits brought in state court, as well
as suits brought in federal court in the first instance, 75 the Takings Clause could
still be invoked as declaratory of one of the “first principles of government”—a
principle that bound the federal and state governments alike. 76 Barron said nothing to the contrary. As the New Jersey Supreme Court said in 1839:
This principle [of compensation for takings] has been made by express enactment, a part of the Constitution of the United States; . . . but it has been
decided that as a constitutional provision, it does not apply to the several
States. Still . . . it is operative as a principle of universal law; and the legislature of this State, can no more take private property for public use, without just compensation, than if this restraining principle were incorporated
into, and made part of its State Constitution. 77
In a world where rights were protected in the social contract before the framing
of a government in a constitution, this view made perfect sense. The “Barron

69. 4 Ark. 18, 21 (1842). On this ground, the court upheld a state law against concealed carry of firearms.
See id. at 28.
70. Id. at 32.
71. Id. at 31.
72. See Eric R. Claeys, Blackstone’s Commentaries and the Privileges or Immunities of United States
Citizens: A Modest Tribute to Professor Siegan, 45 S.D. L. REV. 777, 808–11 (2008). Not everyone took this
view of legislative control to delineate the legal scope of enumerated natural rights. For Justice Lacy, who dissented from the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in Buzzard, the constitutional recognition of the right to keep
and bear arms meant that “this right was excepted out of the general powers of the government and declared
inviolate.” 4 Ark. at 36 (Lacy, J., dissenting).
73. See sources cited supra note 51.
74. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833).
75. Professor Mazzone distinguishes between “diversity” and “nondiversity” cases brought in federal court.
See Mazzone, supra note 51, at 66–67. In my view, the key distinction was between cases—in diversity or otherwise—where the federal court had full jurisdiction as opposed to the more limited jurisdiction that the Supreme
Court had in direct review of state court decisions under Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
76. Gardner v. Trs. of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 168 (N.Y. Ch. 1816); see also Mazzone, supra note
51, at 37–43 (discussing this and other takings cases).
77. Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 N.J.L. 129, 144–46 (1839).
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contrarians,” as Akhil Amar calls them, 78 were effectively taking the same position that Federalists had taken in the late 1780s—just now in reverse.
III. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Modern interpretive controversies over the Fourteenth Amendment presuppose that the rights recognized are federal rights. 79 This Part recovers a different
understanding. 80 In the decades after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court frequently described it as securing rights rather than
creating them. The rights, in other words, were derived from already existing
fundamental law. But while these rights were not originally enforceable in federal court under Barron v. Baltimore, perhaps the Fourteenth Amendment now
made them subject to federal protection.
The starting point for this exploration is the famous Slaughter-House
Cases. 81 The plaintiffs, invoking the newly enacted Fourteenth Amendment,
challenged a Louisiana statute that restricted the location of slaughter-house operations around New Orleans and that gave the Slaughter-House Company an
exclusive license to operate “the live-stock landing and slaughter-house business”
within that area.82
Four of the Supreme Court justices voted for the plaintiffs. 83 As Justice
Field put it in his dissent, their argument had “support in the fundamental law of
the country.” 84 The state had broad authority to pass “regulations affecting the
health, good, order, morals, peace, and safety of society,” Field explained, thus
giving it lawful authority to restrict rights in all sorts of ways “not in conflict
with any constitutional prohibitions, or fundamental principles.” 85 But the state
could not, “under the pretence of prescribing a police regulation,” pass a law that
encroached upon “rights of the citizen, which the Constitution intended to secure
against abridgment.” 86 Notice the wording: secure—not create. The question
that had to be asked, Field continued, was whether the Fourteenth Amendment
“protect[s] the citizens of the United States against the deprivation of their common rights by State legislation.” 87 The answer, he insisted, was yes. The amendment was meant “to place the common rights of American citizens under the
protection of the National government.” 88
These “common rights” did not necessarily enjoy identical legal protection
in each state, Field wrote, echoing the point that Arkansas Chief Justice Ringo
78. See AMAR, supra note 51, at 153.
79. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597–98 (2015).
80. This Part does not purport to address the “original meaning” of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, it
focuses solely on judicial decisions in the decades that followed the Fourteenth Amendment.
81. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
82. Id. at 59.
83. Id. at 83–130.
84. Id. at 86–87 (Field, J., dissenting).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 89.
88. Id. at 93.
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had made decades earlier. 89 “The exercise of these rights and privileges [of citizenship], and the degree of enjoyment received from such exercise,” he noted,
“are always more or less affected by the condition and the local institutions of
the State, or city, or town where he resides.” 90 Fundamental rights, it bears emphasis, were generally not the type of legal immunities that we tend to assume
today; they were simply rights that the government could restrain only by law
and only in promotion of the public good. “They are thus affected in State by the
wisdom of its laws,” Field observed, describing the principle as “a result which
follows from the constitution of society.” 91 These rights did “not derive their existence from its legislation, and cannot be destroyed by its powers.” 92 All of this
should sound familiar. Field was expounding a theory of rights derived from social-contract theory.
So what was the relationship of the Fourteenth Amendment to these rights?
Field’s answer was clear:
The amendment does not attempt to confer any new privileges or immunities upon citizens, or to enumerate or define those already existing. It assumes that there are such privileges and immunities which belong of right
to citizens as such, and ordains that they shall not be abridged by State
legislation. 93
The Fourteenth Amendment did not create rights. 94 And for that reason, as Field
clarified in an opinion the following year, the Fourteenth Amendment did not
“interfere[ ] in any respect with the police power of the State.” 95
Nonetheless, Field explained in his Slaughter-House Cases dissent, the
Amendment had “profound significance and consequence” for the protection of
these already extant “natural and inalienable rights.” 96 The Fourteenth Amendment, he stated later in the opinion, “was intended to give practical effect to the
declaration of 1776 of inalienable rights, rights which are the gift of the Creator,
which the law does not confer, but only recognizes.” 97 How? By enabling means
of federal enforcement. 98
In a separate opinion, Justice Bradley was even more emphatic about the
declaratory nature of civil rights. “[E]ven if the Constitution were silent,” he
wrote, “the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens, as such, would be
89. See State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 28 (1842).
90. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 95.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 95–96.
93. Id. at 96.
94. See id.
95. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. 129, 138 (1874) (Field, J., concurring). Field made the same point in his
opinion for the Court in Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885) (“But neither the [Fourteenth] amendment—
broad and comprehensive as it is—nor any other amendment, was designed to interfere with the power of the
State, sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education,
and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources,
and add to its wealth and prosperity.”).
96. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 105.
98. See id. at 101 (“The fourteenth amendment places them under the guardianship of the National authority.”); see also id. at 121–24 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (making the same point).
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no less real and no less inviolable than they now are. . . . Their very citizenship
conferred these privileges.” 99 The Fourteenth Amendment was designed merely
“to provide National security against violation by the States” of these “fundamental rights” of citizenship; 100 or, as Justice Swayne’s dissenting opinion described them, “the fundamental principles of the social compact.” 101
Of course, the majority in the Slaughter-House Cases disagreed with Justice Field’s understanding of the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States.” 102 These rights, Justice Miller announced for the majority, were
rights of national citizenship, not state citizenship. 103 The Fourteenth Amendment did not “transfer the security and protection of all the civil rights . . . from
the States to the Federal government.” 104 To have done so, he argued, would
have “radically change[d] the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal governments.” 105 Importantly, Miller was not denying the existence of the
underlying rights that the dissenters invoked. 106 He simply denied that the federal government, including federal courts, had responsibility for securing those
rights, at least absent racial discrimination. 107
When federal courts had original jurisdiction in diversity cases, however,
federal judges continued their earlier practice of recognizing general limits on
state power. 108 In Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, for example, the Supreme
Court upheld a municipal bond measure under principles of general constitutional law even though state judicial precedents pointed toward the invalidity of
the measure. 109 “The question before us belongs to the domain of general jurisprudence,” Justice Swayne explained. 110 “In this class of cases this court is not
bound by the judgment of the courts of the States where the cases arise. It must
hear and determine for itself.” 111 Writing for the Court in Loan Association v.
Topeka the following year, 112 Justice Miller explained that “[t]here are limitations on [governmental] power which grow out of the essential nature of all free
governments. Implied reservations of individual rights, without which the social
compact could not exist, and which are respected by all governments entitled to
99. Id. at 119 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 122.
101. Id. at 129 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 75. (majority opinion).
103. Id.
104. See id. at 77.
105. Id. at 78.
106. Put simply, Miller did not deny that there was a right to pursue employment. He did, however, disagree
about whether the restriction of that right by Louisiana was justifiable, at least under the deferential standards of
judicial review.
107. Id. at 81.
108. See, e.g., Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 666, 676 (1874).
109. Id. at 677.
110. Id.
111. Id.; see also Olcott v. Fond du Lac County, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 678, 690 (1873). As Michael Collins
points out, the key distinction in these cases, as well as cases involving statutes, was whether the state rule was
itself founded on general principles of common law (or fundamental law), in which case the federal court sitting
in diversity should apply general law. See Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner—Diversity Jurisdiction and the
Development of General Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1280–81, 1283 (2000).
112. Citizens’ Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 663 (1875).
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the name.” 113 Miller, in other words, agreed with Field about the existence of
general fundamental rights even though he disagreed with Field’s conclusion that
the Fourteenth Amendment made these rights federally enforceable. 114
But the jurisprudential fight was not over. Some justices still believed that
the Fourteenth Amendment provided at least some security for a broader range
of fundamental rights. 115 The premises articulated in these decisions sounded
exactly like the Court’s statements with respect to general constitutional law.116
The scope of state authority over individual rights, Chief Justice Waite explained
for the Court in Munn v. Illinois, 117 was settled in the social contract. “When one
becomes a member of society, he necessarily parts with some rights or privileges,”
Waite wrote. 118 “This does not confer power upon the whole people to control
rights which are purely and exclusively private,” he continued, but the government did have the authority to restrict rights “when such regulation becomes necessary for the public good.” 119 Consequently, “statutes regulating the use, or
even the price of the use, of private property [had not] necessarily deprived an
owner of his property without due process of law.” 120 But then Waite ended with
a cryptic suggestion: “Under some circumstances they may.” 121 Perhaps, he intimated, some state regulations would violate the rights secured under the Fourteenth Amendment.
For a while, the Court showed little willingness to run with this suggestion.
In Davidson v. New Orleans, 122 for example, Justice Miller adamantly denied
that the Due Process Clause could warrant bringing most fundamental-rights
claims into federal court. 123 Takings of property without compensation “maybe
violate some provision of the State Constitution,” Miller explained for the majority, “but the Federal Constitution imposes no restraints on the States in that
regard.” 124 What the Due Process Clause required, he insisted, was “a fair trial
in a court of justice, according to the modes of proceeding applicable to such a
case.” 125 In a separate opinion, Justice Bradley reiterated his view that “arbitrary,

113. Id.
114. See Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105 (1878) (“It may violate some provision of the State
Constitution against unequal taxation; but the Federal Constitution imposes no restraints on the States in that
regard. If private property be taken for public uses without just compensation, it must be remembered that, when
the fourteenth amendment was adopted, the provision on that subject, in immediate juxtaposition in the fifth
amendment with the one we are construing, was left out, and this was taken. It may possibly violate some of
those principles of general constitutional law, of which we could take jurisdiction if we were sitting in review of
a Circuit Court of the United States, as we were in Loan Association v. Topeka (20 Wall. 655).”).
115. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1877).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 124–25.
120. Id. at 125.
121. Id.
122. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1878).
123. Id. at 104.
124. Id. at 105.
125. Id.
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oppressive, and unjust” state abridgments of property rights abridged rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. 126
In the decade that followed, however, the views of Justices Field and Bradley gradually gained traction. “The Fourteenth Amendment . . . undoubtedly intended not only that there should be no arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or
arbitrary spoliation of property, but that equal protection and security should be
given to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and civil
rights,” Justice Field declared for a unanimous court in Barbier v. Connolly, upholding a San Francisco laundry ordinance. 127 The Fourteenth Amendment, he
emphasized, was not meant to interfere with the police powers of the state.128
But by highlighting the limits of state power, Field signaled a willingness to consider the arbitrariness of state legislation under the auspices of Fourteenth
Amendment law. 129
Later the same year, the Court considered a challenge to another San Francisco laundry ordinance in Soon Hing v. Crowley, again rejecting the claim out
of hand. 130 This time, however, the case was originally filed in federal court.131
And Field—just as he had done in Barbier—treated it as one that raised a colorable federal claim. 132 “[State and local] regulations in this matter are not subject
to any interference by the federal tribunals,” he explained, “unless they are made
the occasion for invading the substantial rights of persons, and no such invasion
is caused by the regulation in question.” 133 After all, Barbier had upheld an analogous scheme, and “[n]o invidious discrimination is made against any one by the
measures adopted.” 134 Field carefully went through each of the distinctions in
the statute, explaining its validity. 135 And he further rejected the plaintiff’s claim
that San Francisco had denied the “right to work”:
However broad the right of every one to follow such calling and employ
his time as he may judge most conducive to his interests, it must be exercised subject to such general rules as are adopted by society for the common welfare. All sorts of restrictions are imposed upon the actions of men
notwithstanding the liberty which is guaranteed to each. It is liberty regulated by just and impartial laws. 136
Finally, Field rejected the plaintiff’s “principal objection” that the law “was
adopted owing to a feeling of antipathy and hatred prevailing in the city and
126. Id. at 107 (Bradley, J., concurring).
127. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
128. Id.
129. The prior year, Justices Field and Bradley had reiterated their earlier views about the reach of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Field emphasized that the amendment was not a font of general private law, nor did it
curtail state police powers. See Butchers’ Union v. Crescent City, 111 U.S. 746, 759 (1884) (Field, J., concurring);
id. at 764 (Bradley, J., concurring).
130. Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 711 (1885).
131. Id. at 704.
132. Id. at 708.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 708–09.
136. Id. at 709.
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county of San Francisco against the subjects of the Emperor of China resident
therein.” 137 A facially neutral statute, he explained, would not be “changed from
a legitimate police regulation, unless in its enforcement it is made to operate only
against the class mentioned.” 138
With these two laundry cases, Field had carefully laid the groundwork for
a broader understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. 139 To be sure, the principles he articulated were no libertarian panacea. “[G]eneral rules as are adopted
by society for the common welfare” did not abridge the Fourteenth Amendment,
he insisted—a point that courts would reiterate countless times in the decades to
come. 140 Nonetheless, Field had created an opening for federal suits that alleged
“arbitrary” or “invidious” discrimination. 141
What body of law would courts use to evaluate the scope of state police
powers under this framework? Cases at first suggested the use of general fundamental law. 142 Justice Matthews’s decision for the Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
for instance, stated that “the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness”—as well as limits on governmental power over those rights—flowed
from “the nature and the theory of our institutions of government” and “the principles upon which they are supposed to rest.” 143 These were, as Justice Bradley
had put it in 1884, “primordial and fundamental rights” that the Fourteenth
Amendment had “referred to,” not created. 144
Nonetheless, the actual legal rules that applied—both procedurally and substantively—in state and federal court often differed. From a procedural standpoint, the Supreme Court recognized that “due process” and “equal protection”
did not entail a need for uniform procedures from state to state, or even within a
state. 145 Instead, the people of each state could generally vary procedures according to “their organic law providing for their own affairs.” 146 The states had broad
latitude when it came to the particulars of criminal and civil processes, such as
how many jurors would sit on a jury, whether verdicts had to be unanimous, and
so forth. 147 “[T]he state has full control over the procedure in its courts, both in
137. Id. at 710.
138. Id. at 711.
139. See Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Subsequent Interpretation and Application, 19 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 219, 289–91 (2009); David Bernstein, Lochner, Parity,
and the Chinese Laundry Cases, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (1999).
140. Soon Hing, 113 U.S. at 709.
141. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 367 (1886) (citing Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885)).
142. See, e.g., id. at 369–70.
143. Id. Consequently, he explained, the government could not impose “purely personal and arbitrary
power” over property. Id. at 370.
144. Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 765 (1884) (Bradley, J., concurring). Michael Collins notes a similar ambiguity in
the Court’s later due process decisions, observing that “when lower federal courts resolved questions of ratereasonableness in the exercise of their diversity jurisdiction, it was less than clear whether federal due process as
opposed to ‘general principles’ provided the relevant source of substantive law.” Michael G. Collins, October
Term, 1896—Embracing Due Process, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 71, 81 (2001).
145. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 599 (1900).
146. Id. at 604.
147. See id. at 605.

No. 5]

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BEFORE REALISM

1449

civil and criminal cases,” the Court explained in Maxwell v. Dow, “subject only
to the qualification that such procedure must not work a denial of fundamental
rights or conflict with specific and applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution.” 148
On the substantive side, courts often disagreed about how far the police
powers extended. 149 At first, it was state courts—not their federal counterparts—
that took the lead in recognizing limits on legislative power. 150 “There are certain
fundamental rights of every citizen which are recognized in the organic law of
all our free American states,” the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declared
when striking down a wage regulation in 1891. 151 These fundamental rights were
judicially enforceable, the court explained, “even though the enactment of it is
not expressly forbidden” by the state constitution. 152 Throughout this era, state
courts cited precedent from many jurisdictions—in-state, out-of-state, federal,
and even English—when trying to ascertain the scope of the police powers.153
But, of course, these decisions were not always consistent with one another.154
The scope of state power was often in the eyes of the judge.
Federal courts began more actively reviewing due process challenges in the
mid-1890s. 155 The hint that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
provided a mechanism for substantive review was around much earlier, 156 but
the Court now seemed more confident about the existence of substantive protections offered by the Fourteenth Amendment. 157 These underlying limits, however, were still supplied by general principles—not ones that the Fourteenth
Amendment created.
The logic of “substantive” due process, after all, was simply that the government could only take away life, liberty, and property pursuant to law, and that
legislative acts that violated fundamental social-contractarian principles were not
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., the various opinions cited in Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 160–65
(1897); Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe R.R. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96 (1899).
150. See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN
AMERICA, 1886-1937, at 126–33 (1998).
151. Commonwealth v. Perry, 28 N.E. 1126, 1126 (Mass. 1891).
152. Id. at 1126–27. In that case, the Court noted that the state law “violates fundamental principles of right
which are expressly recognized in our constitution,” though notably the Court did not claim that these fundamental principles were created by the constitution. Id. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.—at that time a state
judge—dissented, stating his view that “The prohibition, if any, must be found in the words of the constitution,
either expressed or implied, upon a fair and historical construction.” Id. at 1127 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
153. One could cite hundreds of cases. See, e.g., Jenks v. Stump, 93 P. 17, 18–19 (Colo. 1907). For an
example of reliance on English cases about “unjust discrimination,” see Chi. & Alton R.R. v. People ex rel.
Koerner, 67 Ill. 11, 27 (1873).
154. See sources cited supra notes 148, 152.
155. See, e.g., Bell’s Gap R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237 (1890).
156. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 141–42 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting) (“Except by due process
of law, no State can deprive any person of [life, liberty, or property]. The provision has been supposed to secure
to every individual the essential conditions for the pursuit of happiness; and for that reason has not been heretofore, and should never be, construed in any narrow or restricted sense.”).
157. See, e.g., Bell’s Gap R.R., 134 U.S. at 237 (“clear and hostile discriminations against particular persons
and classes, especially such as are of an unusual character, unknown to the practice of our governments, might
be obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition”).
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law. 158 Consequently, the argument went, a deprivation of life, liberty, or property in violation of the social contract also violated due process. 159 “An ACT of
the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of
the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority,” Justice Chase had famously argued in Calder v. Bull. 160 At root, then, the
“substantive” limits on state authority were really questions of fundamental law,
not of “due process.” And this appears to have been the Supreme Court’s initial
view. The Fourteenth Amendment “conferred no new and additional rights, but
only extended the protection of the Federal Constitution over rights of life, liberty, and property that previously existed under all state constitutions,” the Court
explained in 1894. 161 Perhaps, then, the substantive dimensions of due process
were questions of general fundamental law. 162
But just two years later, as Michael Collins has observed, the justices decided a string of cases that started to treat these substantive restraints on legislative power as questions of federal law. 163 “We should not be justified in holding
the act to be in violation of the state constitution in the face of clear and repeated
decisions of the highest court of the state to the contrary, under the pretext that
we were deciding principles of general constitutional law,” the Supreme Court
resolved in 1896. 164 “We are therefore practically confined in this case to the
inquiry whether the act in question, as it has been construed by the state courts,
violates the federal constitution.” 165 Whether a state law violated the Due Process Clause, the Court explained, was one that the justices “must decide . . . in
accordance with our views of constitutional law.” 166 While it articulated due process as a federal standard, however, the Court also suggested a need for deference
to “state courts which are to pass upon the question of public use in light of the
facts which surround in their own state.” 167 The “deliberate judgment and matured thought of the courts of that state” thus deserved “very great respect,”168
even regarding the application of a federal rule.
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, state and federal courts engaged in a longrunning dialogue over the proper boundaries of state power. Federal and state
courts constantly referenced each other’s decisions. 169 And sometimes there
158. See Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, No Arbitrary Power: An Originalist Theory of the Due
Process of Law, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1599 (2019).
159. Id.
160. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387–89 (1798).
161. Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Tennessee, 153 U.S. 486, 506 (1894).
162. See Collins, supra note 144, at 81 (“[W]hen lower federal courts resolved questions of rate-reasonableness in the exercise of their diversity jurisdiction, it was less than clear whether federal due process as opposed
to ‘general principles’ provided the relevant source of substantive law.”).
163. See id. at 71–72.
164. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 155 (1896).
165. Id. at 156.
166. Id. at 159.
167. Id. at 160.
168. Id.; see also Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 367–69 (1905).
169. See, e.g., Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623 (1912); Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174
U.S. 96 (1899); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897); McGuire v. Chi., B. & Q.R. Co., 131 Iowa
340 (1906), aff’d, 219 U.S. 549 (1911); Farmers’ & Merchants’ Ins. Co. v. Dabney, 62 Neb. 213 (1901), aff’d
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were disagreements, though my cursory search only revealed one example of a
state court flatly rejecting the reasoning of the Supreme Court. 170 And there were
times when state courts noted the “decisive” or “conclusive” effect of a Supreme
Court decision in cases involving the scope of state police powers. 171 “The questions arising under the federal Constitution will be first considered, for their determination will largely dispose of those arising under the state Constitution,”
the Supreme Court of Vermont stated in 1907. 172 “It is needless to say that on
the federal questions the decisions of the federal Supreme Court are controlling,
so we shall not go much outside of them.” 173
IV. THE REVOLUTION OF LEGAL REALISM
American understandings of rights fundamentally changed with the advent
and eventual triumph of legal realism. 174 Many realists agreed with certain underpinning premises of rights jurisprudence. “The principle of the Lochner case
is simple enough: that arbitrary restriction of men’s activities, unrelated in reason
to the ‘public welfare,’ offends the Fourteenth Amendment,” then-professor Felix Frankfurter observed in 1917. 175 “As to the principle,” Frankfurter noted,
189 U.S. 301 (1903) (same); State v. Nichols, 28 Wash. 628 (1902) (ascertaining the scope of the police powers,
and the Fourteenth Amendment, in reference to other state decisions).
170. See Whitney v. Township Board of Grand Rapids, 71 Mich. 234, 238 (1888) (“I cannot agree with the
chief justice that the legislature can arbitrarily prohibit the sale of liquor in this state, or any portion of the state.”
(disagreeing with Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887))). Occasionally state courts would state their agreement
with Supreme Court decisions in ways sounding like they were exercising independent judgment. See, e.g.,
Shaver v. Martin, 166 Ga. 424, 404 (1928) (“we hold the [Supreme Court’s earlier] judgment [regarding the
scope of police powers under the Fourteenth Amendment] to be sound”). And in Ives v. South Buffalo Railway
Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 317 (1911), the New York Court of Appeals explicitly disagreed with the reasoning of the
Supreme Court in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911), regarding the scope of the police power,
but the justices were careful to delineate that the Supreme Court’s decision was not “controlling of our construction of our own Constitution.” Id. at 317; see also id. at 319 (Cullen, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he decision in the
Noble Bank case is not controlling upon this court in the construction of the Constitution of our own state, and I
am not disposed to accept it, at least, until it has received the approval of a majority of the court.”).
171. See Phenix Ins. Co. v. Hart, 112 Ga. 765, 68 (1901) (“conclusive”); Efland v. Southern Ry. Co., 146
N.C. 135, 359 (1907) (“decisive”).
172. Lawrence v. Rutland R. Co., 80 Vt. 370, 1092 (1907).
173. Id.
174. I use the term “realism” with some hesitation, recognizing that it carries many different connotations.
See Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX. L. REV. 749, 749–50 n.2 (2013) (noting disagreements
about how to define “realism”); Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465 (1988) (discussing many different strands of “realist” thought); see generally NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE (1995) (offering a history of American jurisprudence). As used here, the term embraces strands
of “sociological jurisprudence,” which scholars often distinguish from “realism.” These categorization efforts are
important in some contexts, but not here. The key point for present purposes is that a broad and diverse group of
jurists rejected the earlier view that judges “discover” the law, and in doing so they destroyed the conceptual
underpinnings of general law. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF
LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 155 (1976) (“Sociological Jurisprudence and Realism found the separation between
‘law’ and the interpretations of its officials to be artificial.”).
175. Felix Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law, 29 HARV. L. REV. 353, 369
(1916); see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (accepting the basic
framework of substantive due process but criticizing the majority for insufficiently deferring to legislative judgments); Walter H. Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089, 1111 (1930) (“The court may
doubtless impose a veto upon legislation which is clearly arbitrary.”).
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“there is no dispute.” 176 Rather, the problem emerged “in its application,” given
the extent to which assessments of the public interest often turned on the judges’
personal views. 177
Realists were far more hostile, however, to the Court’s embrace of a declaratory theory of rights. Legal rights, they insisted, were the creature of law—
not something merely recognized by it. 178 Law, for example, had played a material role in producing the very same inequality that progressive legislation sought
to correct. 179 Redistributive progressive legislation, then, was not—as the Supreme Court had declared in Coppage v. Kansas—a form of redistribution for its
own sake, 180 interfering with the “legitimate . . . inequalities of fortune” that inhered in “the nature of things.” 181 Rather, for critics of Lochner, these arguments
about natural rights, social compacts, and so forth, were the “nonsense upon stilts”
that Jeremy Bentham had decried a century earlier. 182 As Justice Holmes famously explained:
Books written about any branch of the common law treat it as a unit, cite
cases from this Court, from the Circuit Courts of Appeals, from the State
Courts, from England and the Colonies of England indiscriminately, and
criticize them as right or wrong according to the writer’s notions of a single
theory. It is very hard to resist the impression that there is one august corpus,
to understand which clearly is the only task of any Court concerned. If there
were such a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but
obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute, the Courts of the
United States might be right in using their independent judgment as to what
it was. But there is no such body of law. The fallacy and illusion that I think
exist consist in supposing that there is this outside thing to be found. Law
is a word used with different meanings, but law in the sense in which courts
speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind it.
The common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common
law or not, is not the common law generally but the law of that State existing by the authority of that State without regard to what it may have been
in England or anywhere else. 183
The Supreme Court, of course, eventually embraced this critique in Erie. 184
176. Frankfurter, supra note 175, at 369.
177. See id.
178. Singer, supra note 174, at 500–01.
179. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Labor Legislation as an Enlargement of Individual Liberty, 15 AM. LAB.
LEGIS. REV. 155 (1925).
180. 236 U.S. 1, 19 (1915) (“The mere restriction of liberty or of property rights cannot of itself be denominated ‘public welfare,’ and treated as a legitimate object of the police power; for such restriction is the very thing
that is inhibited by the Amendment.”).
181. Id. at 17.
182. See, e.g., JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 98–99 (Roland Gray comp.,
The MacMillian Co. 1921) (“When the element of long time is introduced, the absurdity of the view of Law
preexistent to its declaration is obvious.”). For a probing discussion of how this realist critique connected with
broader changes in elite thought, see EDWARD A. PURCELL JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC
NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973).
183. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518,
533–34 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
184. See Erie R. Co. v. Topkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79–80 (1938).
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Realism thus precipitated a powerful shift in the prevailing understanding
of constitutional rights. In Palko v. Connecticut, 185 for example, Justice Cardozo
asked whether governmental appeals in a criminal case were “unlawful by force
of the Fourteenth Amendment” 186 in light of the rights that Fifth Amendment
“creates.” 187 The test of incorporation harkened back to an earlier conception of
fundamental law, asking whether these rights reflected a “principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” 188 But the way that Justice Cardozo talked about the Fourteenth
Amendment hardly reflected the earlier view that it left state authority exactly as
it stood before. The question at hand, Cardozo explained, was ascertaining the
“domain of liberty, withdrawn by the Fourteenth Amendment from encroachment by the states.” 189 The linguistic drift was striking.
With the notion that incorporated rights were federal rights came a natural
assumption that these rights were uniquely subject to federal definition. “[T]he
task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights . . . into concrete
restraints on officials dealing with the problems of the twentieth century, is one
to disturb self-confidence,” Justice Jackson explained in West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette. 190 “But we act in these matters not by authority of our
competence but by force of our commissions.” 191 It was, in other words, the duty
of the judge—and particularly the federal Supreme Court—to ascertain and apply constitutional boundaries on governmental power. 192 “The very purpose of a
Bill of Rights,” Jackson asserted, “was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by courts.”193
Judges were now to be primary authority in ascertaining the meaning of these
185. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
186. Id. at 323.
187. Id. at 322. Compare Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 587 (1900) (describing the Bill of Rights as
“secur[ing] and recogniz[ing] the fundamental rights of the individual as against the exercise of Federal power”—
not as a creating the underlying rights that the amendments secured and recognized), with Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235–36 (1897) (describing the rule against uncompensated takings
as “a principle of universal law” (internal quotation marks omitted)). See also William Michael Treanor, Jam for
Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813, 831–32 (1998) (recognizing Chicago,
Burlington as not an “incorporation” case in the modern sense).
188. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
189. Id. at 327 (emphasis added). For a direct engagement with this issue, see the Brief for Respondent at
140, Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (“There may be such things as rights which exist
apart from an effective means for their enforcement, but if there are such, they are irrelevant to the law; the law
takes no notice of them. In realistic terms a right can only be defined in terms of what a party aggrieved by its
violation can do about it.”). This issue potentially affected whether these rights were protected by federal civilrights statutes (which came with jurisdictional grants that lacked amount-in-controversy requirements). Justice
Stone ended up agreeing with them. Hague, 307 U.S. at 524–32 (Stone, J., concurring). The plurality opinion of
Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Black, did not reach the issue. For a similar analysis to that of the C.I.O. lawyers,
see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J.
710 (1917).
190. 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
191. Id. at 640.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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preferred freedoms. 194 Gone was the earlier notion that the Fourteenth Amendment simply left police powers where they originally stood, with states having
the power to restrict rights in promotion of the public good. 195
For the next several decades, the Supreme Court justices divided over just
how broadly to interpret federal constitutional rights—and particularly those that
operated against the states. Some justices took a capacious view of the Bill of
Rights and insisted that the Fourteenth Amendment fully “incorporated” those
rights against the states. 196 Others had a more limited reading of enumerated
rights and also thought that the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause was even narrower. 197 But by this point, everyone agreed that whatever these rights entailed, all of them were defined by a federal standard, with
supreme interpretive authority resting in the Supreme Court. 198 Gone were the
days of general law.
V. CONCLUSION
The realist movement transformed American constitutional jurisprudence.
The notion that the Fourteenth Amendment had actually created new federal
rights—and not simply secured existing fundamental rights—suggested that federal authorities, and particularly federal judges, were supreme in their exposition.
At the same time, though, it suggested that state constitutional rights might have
a different meaning than their federal counterparts. Both the malady and the antidote that Judge Sutton describes are thus grounded on a modern conception of
rights.

194. Id.
195. Id.
196. This generally describes, for instance, the position taken by Justice Black. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
197. This generally describes, for instance, the position taken by Justice Frankfurter. See, e.g., Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 177 (1952).
198. For the opponents of mechanical incorporation, this national standard was “less rigid and more fluid,”
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942), but it was still defined in terms of federal constitutional law. Had this
more deferential approach prevailed, however, the setting of national standards under the Fourteenth Amendment
would have been less intrusive on state power, and therefore the dynamics that Judge Sutton describes in his book
would likely have been far different.

